Culture Versus Structure in Post-9-11 Security Studies; Strategic Insights: v.4, issue 10 (October 2005) by Desch, Michael A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2005-10
Culture Versus Structure in Post-9-11
Security Studies; Strategic Insights: v.4,
issue 10 (October 2005)
Desch, Michael A.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Strategic Insights
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/25396
 Culture Versus Structure in Post-9/11 Security Studies 
Strategic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 10 (October 2005) 
by Michael C. Desch 
Strategic Insights is a monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
For a PDF version of this article, click here. 
Introduction 
Cultural theories have long enjoyed a prominent place in the field of international security. Indeed, 
two waves have come and gone since the start of World War II, and we are now at the high water 
mark of a third.[1] The terrorist attacks of September 11th in the United States, the July 2005 
London Underground attacks, and the numerous suicide bombings in the Occupied Territories 
and Iraq have led to renewed interest in the role Islamic culture may be playing in the increasingly 
frequent use of this tactic and expectations for a quick end to the war in Iraq were the result of 
misunderstandings about Arab strategic culture.  
Today’s culturalists in national security studies are a heterogeneous lot, as they bring a variety of 
different theories to the table. But virtually all new culturalists in security studies are united in their 
belief that realism, the dominant research program in international relations which emphasizes 
factors such as the material balance of power, is an overrated, if not bankrupt, body of theory, 
and that cultural theories, which look to ideational factors, do a much better job of explaining how 
the world works. 
This memorandum assesses this latest wave of cultural theories in security studies by focusing 
on some of its most prominent examples. There is no question that virtually all cultural theories 
tell us something about how states behave. The crucial question, however, is whether these new 
theories merely supplement realist theories or actually threaten to supplant them. My argument is 
that when you run the different cultural theories up against the evidence from the real world, it 
becomes apparent that there is no reason to think that they will relegate realist theories to the 
dustbin of social science history. The best case that can be said for the new cultural theories in 
security studies is that they are sometimes useful as a supplement to realist theories. This 
becomes clear when we consider the track record of culturalist theories in explaining two key 
aspects of the post-9/11 security environment: the rise of suicide bombing and the course of the 
war in Iraq. 
Why Culture Cannot Supplant Realist Theories in National Security 
The post-Cold War wave of culturalism in security studies is a broad research program with a 
wide range of research foci (such as military doctrine, escalation, weapons acquisition, grand 
strategy, and foreign policy decision-making), embracing a diverse range of epistemologies (from 
the avowedly positivistic to the explicitly antipositivistic), and utilizing a broad array of explanatory 
variables. Four strands of cultural theorizing dominate the current wave: organizational, political, 
strategic, and global. For example, Jeffrey Legro holds that militaries have different organizational 
cultures that will lead them to fight differently.[2] Elizabeth Kier argues that different domestic 
political cultures will adopt divergent means of controlling their militaries based on domestic 
political considerations, not external strategic concerns.[3] Similarly, Peter Katzenstein and 
Noburo Okawara and Thomas Berger maintain that domestic political attitudes toward the use of 
force vary significantly among states similarly situated in the international system.[4] Stephen 
Rosen argues that societies with different domestic social structures will produce different levels 
of military power.[5] Iain Johnston suggests that domestic strategic culture, rather than 
international systemic imperatives, best explains a state’s grand strategy.[6] Martha Finnemore 
argues that global cultural norms, rather than domestic state interests, determine patterns of 
great power intervention.[7] Likewise, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald claim that global 
cultural norms proscribing the use of particular weapons best account for why they are not 
used.[8] Robert Herman argues that the Soviet Union bowed out of the Cold War because it was 
attracted to the norms and culture of the West.[9] Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that alliances 
such as NATO coalesce around global norms rather than responding to mutual threats.[10] In a 
similar vein, Michael Barnett maintains that common identity, rather than shared threat, best 
explains alliance patterns.[11] Finally, Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman argue that all states will 
acquire similar sorts of high-technology conventional weaponry, not because they need them, but 
because these weapons epitomize “stateness.”[12]  
These diverse arguments have a common thread: dissatisfaction with realist explanations for 
state behavior in the realm of national security. As Iain Johnston notes, “All [cultural approaches] 
take the realist edifice as target, and focus on cases where structural material notions of interest 
cannot explain a particular strategic choice.”[13] Although it is obvious that cultural theories seek 
to challenge the realist research program, the key question is whether the new strategic 
culturalism supplants or supplements realist explanations?[14] Some of the new strategic 
culturalists take an uncompromising position that rejects realism as a first cut at explaining 
strategic behavior and maintains that material and structural variables are of “secondary 
importance.”[15] Others concede that sometimes structural variables will trump culture but that 
most of the time the reverse will be true.[16] All maintain that cultural variables are more than 
epiphenomena to material factors and often explain outcomes for which realism cannot 
account.[17] Because no proponent of realism thinks that realist theories explain everything,[18] 
there will be little argument about culture, or any other variables, supplementing realism. The 
major debate will concern whether cultural theories can supplant realist theories.  
The central problem with the new culturalism in security studies is that its theories, by themselves, 
do not provide much additional explanatory power beyond existing structural theories. 
Subsequent reassessments of why the United States failed in Vietnam and its clear victory in the 
Cold War demonstrate that these Cold War culturalist arguments were wrong. The U.S. loss in 
Vietnam became the well-spring of concern about the deficiencies of U.S. strategic culture.[19] 
But a convincing case can be made that the U.S. government and military accomplished their 
main goal of preserving a non-communist government in South Vietnam from 1965 to 1973.[20] 
Moreover, to the extent that the United States failed in Vietnam, that failure had more to do with 
the insurmountable task of nation-building and the many deficiencies of our ally than with any 
American cultural short-comings.[21] If culture was such a critical explanation for the outcome of 
the Vietnam War, how does one explain the dramatically different combat performances of the 
North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong compared with the South Vietnamese army? All were 
products of similar strategic and political cultures. A few years later, the Soviet Union with its 
supposedly more effective strategic and political cultures did no better in a similar sort of war in 
Afghanistan.[22] The nuclear revolution, a major technological change in the structure of the 
international system, ultimately had roughly equivalent effects on the behavior, if not the rhetoric, 
of both the United States and the Soviet Union.[23] Most damning for the Cold War wave, 
however, was the final outcome of the Cold War.  
Despite forecasts of doom by culturalists at the time,[24] the democratic, commercial, and non-
Clausewitzian United States clearly won the Cold War,[25] and it did so with largely the same 
strategic and political cultures that had “lost” Vietnam. It also handily won the Persian Gulf 
War.[26] One recent book, though sympathetic to the cultural approach, nonetheless shows how 
traditional theories of Soviet domestic politics, which relied heavily on cultural variables, led the 
vast majority of Sovietologists to miss the dramatic changes that were taking place right under 
their noses.[27] In short, the Cold War wave of cultural theorizing made predictions that largely 
turned out to be wrong.  
Although the post-Cold War wave of cultural theorizing has, for the most part, not yet been 
proven wrong, it will not supplant realist theories in national security studies because it has 
selected cases that do not provide crucial tests that enable us to distinguish which theories are 
better.[28] Instead of selecting “hard cases” for cultural theories, much of the new cultural 
literature in security studies relies on four other types of cases:  
1. “most likely” cases for the culturalist theories;  
2. cases that have the same outcomes as predicted by realist theories;  
3. cases where the culturalist interpretations are disputable; and  
4. cases in which it is too early to tell what the outcome will be.  
How Culture Might Supplement Existing Theories in National Security 
As a supplement to existing theories cultural theories have at least three contributions to make. 
First, cultural variables may explain the lag between structural change and alterations in state 
behavior. Second, cultural variables may account for why some states behave irrationally and 
suffer the consequences of failing to adapt to the constraints of the international system. Finally, 
in structurally indeterminate situations, domestic variables such as culture may have a more 
independent impact.  
Culturalist arguments can supplement existing theories by providing an explanation of the lag 
between structural change and alterations in state behavior.[29] For instance, during the Cold 
War both the United States and the Soviet Union were models of civilian control of the military.[30]  
With the end of the Cold War, evidence is accumulating that civilian control of the military in both 
the former Cold War antagonists has weakened.[31] Brian Taylor offers a very convincing 
argument that residual norms of military subordination to civilian control have kept the Russian 
military from launching a coup or otherwise intervening more directly in Russian politics.[32] 
Taylor’s organizational cultural argument, however, has trouble accounting for the relative 
weakening of Russian civilian control of the military compared with the firm civilian control of the 
Soviet military during the Cold War that he documents.[33] As a supplement to existing theories, 
culture works well; but on its own, culture cannot supplant them.  
Cultural variables may also explain why some states act contrary to the structural imperatives of 
the international system. Structure never directly determines outcomes; rather, it operates 
through a variety of mechanisms: socialization, emulation, and competition. Kenneth Waltz 
suggests that states are not forced to adopt any particular pattern of behavior by the international 
structure. Rather, observing that other states which conform their behavior to the structure of the 
international system do better in competition with other states, states will gradually learn to do so 
as well. Waltz succinctly summarizes his argument: “The theory explains why states similarly 
placed behave similarly despite their internal differences.”[34] Realists such as Waltz expect that 
states in roughly similar structural positions should act similarly if they are to survive and 
prosper.[35] Kenneth Pollack makes a compelling case that Arab political culture undermines the 
ability of Arab armies to successfully conduct modern armored warfare.[36] But since the Arabs 
consistently suffered as a result of their inability to conduct armored warfare, this culturalist theory 
does not challenge realist arguments about the consequences of their failure to successfully 
emulate the dominant powers.[37] Only if the Arabs had consistently done well in armored 
warfare despite their distinct domestic political culture, could culturalist theories plausibly claim to 
supplant realist theories by explaining both behavior and outcomes. Pollack’s argument therefore 
supplements, but does not supplant, existing theories.  
Finally, as Waltz suggests: "One must ask how and to what extent the structure of a realm 
accounts for outcomes."[38] Structure tends to establish parameters; actual outcomes are 
sometimes determined by other factors. This makes the competition between cultural and 
rationalist theories less sweeping but also more intense. In structurally indeterminate 
environments, culturalist and realist theories often make similar predictions about state behavior 
and international outcomes; thus the crucial cases for deciding between them will be in 
structurally determinate environments.  
The major issue of contention will be how often structure is determinate or not. Realists maintain 
that structure is frequently determinate, and so it makes sense to begin with it; culturalists argue 
that material structure is so often indeterminate that it makes sense to begin with other 
variables.[39] This issue is important inasmuch as realist theories are likely to accord significant 
weight to cultural or any other type of variable when structure is indeterminate. In a determinate 
structural environment, where states have only one or at most a few satisfactory strategic choices, 
realist theories expect culture to serve mostly as a dependent, or an intervening variable, that 
usually reflects the structural environment, changing slowly enough to cause a lag between 
structural change and changes in state behavior. In indeterminate structural environments, where 
states have many optimal choices, realist theories ought to have little trouble according culture, or 
any other domestic variable, a greater independent role in explaining state behavior.  
In Civilian Control of the Military, I show how different combinations of domestic and international 
security threats produce more or less determinative structural environments. When a state faces 
either external or internal threats, structure is determinative; when it faces both, or neither, 
structure is indeterminate. In such an indeterminate threat envi ronment, it is necessary to look to 
other variables to explain various types of strategic behavior. Culture and other domestic 
variables may take on greater independent explanatory power in these cases. The challenge for 
scholars interested in international relations and comparative politics is to determine when, under 
what conditions, and to what extent other structural environments—or other, non-structural 
factors—affect outcomes. 
Structure, Culture, and the Global War on Terrorism 
There has been much interest in the motives of suicide bombers among scholars and policy 
makers since September 11, 2001. Many would agree with Michael Ignatieff that the “most 
dangerous thing about [suicide] terrorism is... that terrorists are responding to grievances about 
which, in fact, they do not care.... The hijackers were more interested in the spectacle of 
destruction, in violence for its own sake...”[40] "The Arab –Israeli quarrel is not a cause of Islamic 
extremism," Richard Perle maintains "the unwillingness of the Arabs to end the quarrel is a 
manifestation of the underlying cultural malaise from which Islamic extremism emerges."[41]  
Or as New York Times foreign affairs columnist Thomas Friedman puts it, “many of these 
terrorists hate our existence, not just our policies.”[42] Others attribute this to the “culture of 
death” in deeply embedded in Islamic societies. As Princeton professor Bernard Lewis puts it: “If 
the peoples of the Middle East continue on their present path, the suicide bomber may become a 
metaphor for the whole region...”[43] From this perspective suicide terrorism is an irrational act, 
motivated not by consistent and logical strategic goals, but rather by archaic and dysfunctional 
ideas unique to Islamic societies.[44] In other words, the Arabs are just like that.  
In contrast, Robert Pape convincingly argues that we ought to think about suicide terrorism as a 
strategic exercise in coercion to achieve national liberation and as a form of asymmetric warfare, 
rather than as the result of irrational religious fundamentalism. Overall, I find this argument both 
logically and empirically quite compelling. The fact that almost all suicide bombing campaigns 
have taken place in the context of national liberation struggles is persuasive evidence for his view 
that they are most often part of a rational and coherent strategy.[45]  
I am not fully persuaded, though, by his argument about the role that religion plays in these 
campaigns. Pape posits that religious difference makes it more likely that groups will wage 
suicide terrorism campaigns to achieve independence but he thinks that the specific content of 
these religions is largely irrelevant. In his APSR article, which employed data up through 2002, 
this aspect of his argument seemed plausible inasmuch as the largest single suicide bombing 
campaign was waged by the secular and non-Muslim Tamil LTTE. But if you look at the data in 
his new book Dying to Win, which goes through the end of 2003, 71% of the suicide attacks are 
conducted by individuals from Islamic societies and they account for 90% of the deaths inflicted 
by suicide terrorism since 1980.[46] I have seen CENTCOM data that counts 279 suicide terrorist 
attacks from the beginning of the U.S. occupation of Iraq through April of 2005, which would 
make this the single largest campaign by an order of magnitude and further increases the Islamic 
character of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism even more (to 85% of the total).  
Pape deals with this issue in his book by pointing out that many of these Islamic incidents were 
carried out under the auspices of secular groups like the Palestinian al-Fatah or the Lebanese 
Syrian Social Nationalist Party and concludes that the individual bombers were not religiously 
motivated. I don’t find this fully persuasive, however, because using the orientation of the group 
claiming credit for the suicide attack does not really get at the individual’s motivation for becoming 
a bomber. In my view this would be analogous to arguing that German Christianity had little to do 
with Nazi anti-semitism because National Socialism was an avowedly secular political movement. 
That is certainly true but many individual Nazis were practicing Christians and even those who 
were not came out of a decidedly Christian culture which undoubtedly played some role in their 
view of the Jews. Of course if in the future many more non-Islamic groups begin to employ 
suicide terrorism in their national liberation struggles, Pape’s argument about the irrelevance of 
the specific content of religions mattering will become more compelling. As of now, however, I am 
not convinced that suicide terrorism is a tactic that many non-Islamic national liberation 
movements can use.  
None of this is to say that I disagree with either Pape’s larger theoretical argument —that suicide 
terrorism ought to be seen as a rational strategy of coercion and asymmetric warfare—nor do I 
dissent from any of his very sensible policy recommendations—particularly the importance of 
understanding how U.S. military deployments in the Islamic world can inflame nationalist 
sentiments. But it does suggest to me another important way in which structural and cultural 
arguments ought to be combined. In this case, it seems to me that structural variables 
(nationalism and asymmetric warfare) explain the strategy of suicide terrorism campaigns. In 
other words, suicide bombing has mostly been employed by weaker actors to achieve rational 
strategic objectives such as driving out stronger powers from their countries. However, it also 
seems clear that the tactic of suicide bombing is one only available to national liberation 
movements coming out of certain cultures. Indeed, the overwhelmingly Islamic character of the 
phenomenon is becoming increasingly clear every day in Iraq. In other words, structural realism 
would lead us to expect some form of asymmetric warfare when larger powers occupy smaller 
ones; cultural theories might explain the particular form it will take. Together, structural and 
cultural explanations for suicide terrorism give us a much better sense of why groups employ this 
tactic and which groups are most likely to do so than do purely cultural explanations.  
Another example of where cultural theories have lead us astray is the current war in Iraq. It is 
probably not a coincidence that Kenneth Pollack, who literally wrote the book detailing how Arab 
culture undermined the effectiveness of Arab militaries in waging modern armored warfare, would 
argue in a subsequent book that a relatively small U.S. military force would “have little difficulty 
overrunning the Iraqi armed forces and conquering the country” because “there is substantial 
evidence that the Iraqi armed forces will not fight to death for Saddam’s regime.”[47] To be sure, 
Pollack never argued that it would be a “cakewalk,” the way many neoconservatives did.[48] 
Indeed, it has also been a staple of neoconservative rhetoric about Arab culture that Arabs only 
respect military force.[49] But still, a big part of his case for war rested on the belief that U.S. 
military could relatively easily achieve its objective of ousting Saddam (and in this he was 
generally proven correct) and rebuild an Iraq that would be “stable, prosperous, and... not a 
source of violence and instability” (a task that proved far more difficult).[50]  
Pollack’s book did much to push many fence-sitters into the party of war.[51] It was persuasive in 
part because it convinced many that threat of inaction was too high because a Saddam with 
weapons of mass destruction was undeterrable (in part for political cultural reasons) and that he 
was vulnerable (largely for strategic cultural reasons). The problem with this strategic cultural 
argument is that it assumed that the war would end with the defeat of Saddam’s conventional 
military forces. Pollack turned out to be only half-right: While Saddam’s military was no match for 
the United States in a conventional stand-up fight, large numbers of Iraqi soldiers were 
nonetheless willing to fight and die to resist the American invasion.[52]  
Learning very quickly that a symmetrical response was not working and proving very costly, 
former regime loyalist and other Sunni nationalists very quickly adopted an asymmetrical strategy 
by shifting to guerrilla warfare. Moreover, some recognition of the power of nationalism (a 
ubiquitous, rather than culturally specific trait) and the option of asymmetric warfare in the face of 
overwhelming U.S. conventional superiority, would have tempered optimism that simply ousting 
Saddam would have solved all of our problems in Iraq. This, by the way, was Israel’s experience 
in Lebanon twenty-two years earlier when they entertained similarly grandiose ideas of using a 
quick military victory to reorient a large part of the Middle East. The Israel Defense Forces won 
quick and decisive conventional military victories against the Syrians and the PLO, but their 
subsequent occupation sparked Shia nationalism and guerrilla resistance which forced them to 
eventually withdraw in defeat.[53] A strictly cultural approach to Iraq would lead us to think that 
Arabs are militarily incompetent and that in the face of overwhelming force they will submit. 
Events in Iraq (and Lebanon previously) suggest a much more nuanced perspective: Arab Armies 
may not be very effective in high-technology conventional warfare but they are very good 
guerrillas when faced with superior forces. Moreover, there does not seem to be more of a 
cultural predisposition for Arabs to submit to force than any other group. Indeed, as the Israelis 
discovered in Lebanon and we are learning in Iraq, foreign occupation breeds a nationalist 
backlash. This has been the nearly universal response and has little to do with Arab culture, per 
se.   
Conclusions 
The new cultural theories in security studies show some promise of supplementing realist 
theories by explaining lags between structural change and state behavior, accounting for deviant  
state behavior, and explaining behavior in structurally indeterminate environments. Thus there is 
no doubt that culture matters and that the return to thinking about cultural variables will make 
some contribution to our understanding of post-Cold War international security issues. For these 
and other reasons, the post-Cold War wave of articles, chapters, and books on strategic culture 
will be widely read and stimulate much productive debate.  
The problem is that some new culturalists in security studies, like many of the old culturalists in 
other fields,[54] claim too much for cultural explanations. By themselves, cultural variables do not 
provide much additional explanatory power. The Cold War wave was largely discredited. The 
post-Cold War wave is not fully persuasive because it relies upon cases that do not provide much 
evidence of its ability to supplant realism. Purely cultural theories will do little to help us 
understand the dynamics of the Global War on Terrorism, as recent discussions of suicide 
bombing suggest and the course of the war in Iraq suggest. In short, the new strategic culturalist 
theories will not supplant realist theories in national security studies because, by themselves, they 
have very limited explanatory power.  
Many culturalists seem to recognize this and so they turn out, in the final analysis, to be 
ambivalent about how much independent explanatory power cultural variables have in national 
security studies. Most new culturalists would agree with Legro that “cultures are... not mere 
weather vanes to environmental forces or strategic rationality.”[55] Rather, they are often 
independent variables. But elsewhere Legro admits that: “Reality can be socially constructed, but 
only with available materials and within existing structures... however, when the contradiction 
between external conditions and cultural tendencies becomes too great, culture will likely 
adapt.”[56] On this point, many other new strategic culturalist scholars are equivocal: Kier, for 
example, concludes that “culture has (relative) causal autonomy.”[57] While everyone agrees that 
culture matters, the critical question is how much independent explanatory power it has. We can 
only answer that question when we have a clear sense of whether culture is often an independent 
causal variable (as most culturalists believe) or mostly an intervening or dependent variable (as 
realist theories would maintain).  
The empirical track-record of strategic culture suggests caution about how much of strategic 
behavior is explained exclusively by cultural variables. Therefore we should not yet abandon 
realist theories in favor of the new culturalism in security studies. Of course, when realist theories 
are found wanting, we should supplement them with new culturalist theories. But this will turn out 
to be the case less often than the new culturalists suggest. While we should applaud the return to 
culture in national security studies, we should not be swept away by that wave.  
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